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I. INTRODUCTION
With the ongoing deregulation of electricity markets, firms behave differently in this new setting. When investing in generation capacity, they are faced with uncertainties related to the future demand of electricity and to the investment and production decisions of their competitors. Ventosa et al. (2005) give an overview about decision support models used in electricity market modeling. There exist two types of equilibrium models. First, Cournot competition where the players compete in quantity and second, supply function equilibria (SFE) where the firms compete over their offer curves. What both approaches have in common, is that they are based on the concept of Nash (1951) equilibria, i.e. when each players strategy is the best response to its opponents actions, the market has found an equilibrium.
An important aspect of a dynamic oligopoly model is the assumption about the information structure. The literature distinguishes between the following three cases (see, e.g., Cellini and Lambertini, 2004) . Open-loop equilibria only take into account the initial state variables and the time, but they do not include any strategic interaction based on the evolution of the state variables over time. They are not subgame perfect, meaning that not in all stages the strategies have to be Nash equilibria, and players must commit to their decisions forever. The initial and current levels of all state variables are taken into account in closed-loop equilibria, which can only be found for special cases (see Murphy and Smeers, 2005) . In a feedback equilibrium information about the accumulated stock of each state variable at the current date is included.
There is a wide diversity of papers that deals with Cournot equilibria in the spot market for electricity (see, e.g. Borenstein and Bushnell, 1999; Otero-Novas et al., 2000) . Here, the strategic decision making is performed under a short time horizon. The following recent papers specifically model the investment problem in electricity markets, which clearly has a medium to long-term focus. Pineau and Murto (2003) formulate a model with sample path optimization for the Finnish electricity market. The information structure is open-loop and the strategies of the players adapt to the sample path of the stochastic variable, i.e. demand.
They consider an open-loop information structure appropriate because electricity generators stick to their investment decisions for some time while only adjusting for shocks in exogenous variables. In their results, the presence of uncertain demand growth and strategic behavior can reduce investment incentives. They solve the optimization problem with two methods, i.e. the first directly solves the necessary conditions of the Nash equilibrium, the second method uses variational inequalities. Murphy and Smeers (2005) compare an openloop and a closed-loop model to the perfect competition case. They provide proofs for the existence and the uniqueness of the solutions. They convert the inverse of the load duration curve to a probability density function and interpret it as a way to cope with the overall uncertainty about the future demand for electricity. The closed-loop formulation leads to a two-stage equilibrium problem which is difficult to handle numerically. The search through second-stage equilibria needs to be done by enumerating all complementarity sets of the second-stage problem. Neuhoff et al. (2005) analyze electricity markets with transmission constraints but their models are static. Sauma and Oren (2006) evaluate social welfare implications of investments in transmission capacity. Market deregulation has led to independent companies that operate the transmission network but may not necessarily work in the generation business as well. For the generators action they use a simplified version of the Murphy and Smeers (2005) generation capacity investment model. Centeno et al. (2007) model medium-term strategic generation decisions based on a conjectured price-response market equilibrium. Lise and Kruseman (2008) propose a model that consists of a static part that reflects trade, capacity and environmental constraints, and a dynamic part which focuses on investment decisions in the long run. Genc et al. (2007) consider several stochastic programming formulations of the dynamic oligopolistic investment game. Their games with expected scenarios (GES) are similar to the formulation in Pineau and Murto (2003) . They consider the so-called games with probabilistic scenarios (GPS) as an appropriate model, which they test with data for the Canadian electricity market. One of their conclusions is that stochastic programming models can cope with game formulations, that can not be addressed with dynamic programming. In Genc and Sen (2008) a more detailed example for the Ontario electricity market can be found, which is again formulated as a game with probabilistic scenarios. One drawback of the formulation is, that the used PATH solver is not converging when using more than six stages. The contribution of this paper is that it extends the work of Genc et al. (2007) and Genc and Sen (2008) in three important directions. First, we take the model to a more detailed level by using all available technologies and a realistic approximation of the load duration curve. The second, and more important contribution is that we establish a competitive benchmark and link the model to economic theory to answer the normative question whether such an oligopolistic investment game under uncertainty leads to an optimal level of investments and an optimal technology mix. Third, we explore possible remedies against the underinvestment problem we found. One would be introducing more competition to move the market toward the perfect competition benchmark. Furthermore, price caps might not be as bad for investments as suggested by some authors as in the case of an oligopolistic investment model, they can mitigate the incentive to withhold or cut investments to drive up prices.
II. DATA
The German electricity market was liberalized in 1998 and is the largest in Europe with a gross production of 633.2 TWh in 2006 (International Energy Agency, 2007a) . More than half of the power is generated with coal, other major sources are nuclear and gas. The German power market is dominated by a few large players (E.ON, RWE, EnBW, Vattenfall). These firms are transmission system operators and own 90% of total generation capacity. Brunekreeft and Bauknecht (2006) report values for the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) 1 of over 2000. Electricity distribution is organized by approximately 900 communal distributors. The German energy market regulator Bundesnetzagentur was installed in 2005. There are several interesting developments on the German electricity market. For example, new capacities are urgently needed as Germany decided on a phase-out of nuclear power generation by 2020 (International Energy Agency (2007b) ). In addition to that, a large stake of the existing generation capacities are close to the end of its service life. The German Energy Agency estimates that investments in generation capacity of up to 40,000 MW will be necessary, see Fig. 1 . This, together with a tendency towards more environmental-friendly technologies supports the importance of exploring investment incentives. The question is whether there will be enough and efficient investments.
In the last years, the price levels on German wholesale electricity markets have been rising as reported by Weigt and von Hirschhausen (2007) who attribute this development to market power. In a similar vein, Brunekreeft and Twelemann (2005) argue that this rising prices are the result of market power of the "'Big Four"' which is now exercised on wholesale markets as transmission tariffs (the big four are vertically integrated) came under increased regulatory pressure. Apart from that, our analysis will abstract from vertical relationships and transmission constraints. According to International Energy Agency (2007b), there are no significant congestions within Germany. Cross boarder transfer capacities and congestions there are given in table I and help us to determine the relevant market. There seem to be no congestions at all between Germany and Austria, so we include Austrian demand and fringe supply into our analysis. The heavily congested lines to Denmark and The Netherlands suggest that exports from Germany to the latter countries take place at maximum capacities all the year long, so we subtract the respective exports form German supply. French and Czech Capacities are added to the non-strategic fringe but only up to their import capacity constraint.
Total final electricity consumption grew by 1.4 % a year between 1990 and 2005 however, there are governmental plans to significantly increase energy efficiency and thereby halt demand growth (International Energy Agency (2007b) ) which adds some uncertainty on demand.
Another important development is the introduction of the CO2 trading scheme. The emission abatement costs are relatively cheap in the electricity industry by switching from coal to gas generation, or from lignite to hard coal. This is why the price of CO2 has long been guessed to converge to the price of CO2 at which a coal plant would replaced by a gas plant. The best estimate we have right now for the future price of CO2 is the average EEX future price for the second CO2 trading period which lasts from 2008 to 2013 and is at 22.5 euro per tonne Tab. II gives an overview about the existing installed capac- 
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
The reactor construction and nuclear fuel operations within the Siemens Group were merged with the French company Framatome in 2001. Following restructuring of the French nuclear industry, the German operations are now owned by Areva NP GmbH, which is jointly owned by the Areva Group of France (66%) and Siemens AG (34%). This includes the nuclear fuel fabrication plant at Lingen in Lower Saxony, which produces fuel for German and other nuclear plants. Most raw uranium concentrate, or yellowcake, is purchased from Canada, which provides slightly less than half of the supply.
The British-Dutch-German uranium enrichment company Urenco owns and operates a large centrifuge enrichment plant at Gronau in North RhineWestphalia, which began operations in 1985. In 2005 Urenco was granted a licence to increase the site's capacity from 1.8 million to 4.5 million separative work units per year, and this is expected to be implemented gradually over the coming years. The plant supplies enriched uranium for use in countries around the world. 
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Note: Estimated closure dates calculated assuming 88% capacity factor, and no transfer of generating allowances between plants. Source: Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) for residual generation data.
Figure 22
Estimated Nuclear Power Capacity, 2007 to 2023 Source: International Energy Agency (2007b ity and the different production technologies. The major stake of electricity trading is done in OTC markets for which it is hard to obtain data. However, the European Energy Exchange (EEX) gains more and more importance. Market participants there can participate in day-ahead hourly contract auctions, or can trade block contracts and emission permits in continuous trading. Prices from the EEX can be used as a good approximation for the wholesale price of electricity. Plotting the prices against the trading volumes does not show a strong correlation. We see the expected positive relationship when comparing the exchange prices to the actual electricity demand per hour, see Fig. 2 . To account for different states of the market, we separated the price-quantity combinations which occurred within a year by prices. As can be seen in Table III , markets with extremely high prices occur only seldomly and prices between 20 and 40 are most common. For each of the six states in which the market might be we created linear demand functions based on average prices and quantities in these states. Note, that we also model the high-price market segment, to include price spikes which are a stylized fact of electricity prices. To construct demand curves, Neuhoff et al. (2005) use a demand elasticity of 0.1, whereby Genc et al. (2007) argue that 0.2 is more commonly used to simulate the electricity market. As we have a more long run focus, we decided to use the latter value. It might be argued, that electricity demand is completely inelastic, as maybe only a very few industrial clients reduce their demand when prices rise. In response to that, Bushnell (2003) notes that imports and exports provide some elasticity. Auer et al. (2006) and are shown in Table IV . For pump storage plants we used the real option value of peak load electricity, which we approximated by the average option price for peak load electricity at the EEX in the year 2006. We do not provide fixed costs for pump hydropower and oil plants. In the case of hydropower plants construction costs depend heavily on the respective sites and therefore such costs are hard to estimate. Furthermore, all available sites for significant hydropower capacities in Central Europe seem to be occupied already. Oil fired plants are not considered a relevant investment option, because oil prices are just too high. The fixed investment costs can also be interpreted as present value of future yearly costs of capital.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS
A. Supply function equilibria vs. market states Klemperer and Meyer (1989) show that when a firm faces a range of possible residual demand curves, which is actually the case in electricity markets, the expected profit can be increased by not just offering one quantity or price, but a schedule which sets a price for each possible demand that might materialize. The equilibrium arising from such behavior is called a supply function equilibrium (SFE). On an electricity wholesale market, such a strategy is clearly possible. Green and Newbery Source: Auer et al. (2006) (1992) apply this model to the British electricity spot market at which bids have to be submitted for a whole day. At the EEX however, bids can be submitted one day ahead for every hour of the day allowing generators to forecast demand with a high degree of accuracy. By considering enough possible future market states, one can thereby overcome much of this disadvantage a traditional Cournot model has compared to the SFE approach. For example, a firm could set quantities offered to be optimal for a typical eight o'clock winter morning market or a typical summer nighttime market. As shown in part ??, we will approximate the different market states by assuming that demand is normally distributed. Another reason why we apply on the Cournot approach is because it is easier applicable to real world problems whereby SFE can only be found under strong assumptions and convergence problems arise quite often.
B. Optimal Investments and Peak-load pricing
In electricity markets, demand varies from hour to hour and as electricity is not storable, it has to be met at any time of the day. If capacities are a binding constraint, there has to be rationing by rising prices. Of course, such rationing causes welfare to decrease. On the other hand however, there are capacity costs. The literature on peak load pricing provides results on how to balance these two effects optimally (see Crew and Kleindorfer, 1986) . A related aspect is that this setting leads to a two stage game. It might take years to build new capacities, but short run production quantities can be changed every hour or even every minute. This has two implications for a suitable modeling of the investment decision: First, uncertainty has to be taken into account, so even without the strategic interaction of players a two stage model seems appropriate. The second implication is the strategic interaction of players which must take into account which impact their decision on investment will have on the market.
How should capacities be set optimally? Under perfect competition, prices will be set to marginal costs in periods in which capacities are not binding, and to marginal costs plus a scarcity rent in high demand periods. Under the assumption that there are fixed capacity costs, how much capacity should be built, taking into account that demand is fluctuating? As capacities are binding in high demand periods, a premium over marginal costs occurs which reflects the value of one additional Source: own calculations unit of capacity in terms of consumers willingness to pay. As this value also reflects the value of additional capacity to society, we know that a social planner and perfect competition yield the same results. In periods in which capacity is not binding, the corresponding premium equals zero reflecting the fact that in such states capacity is of no value. Consider the example in Figure 3 . There is an equal chance to have a period of high (D H ) or low demand (D L ). Optimal capacity is where the price premium over short run marginal costs (M C SR ) is equal to capacity costs (M C LR ). According to Murphy and Smeers (2005) this can also be seen from a real option perspective. A firm only invests if the expected earnings it can generate from its capacity e.g. the expected scarcity rents are bigger than the costs.
Would there be other demand states in which capacities are not binding, these demand states would not add an additional incentive to invest. Actually, this is not only true for perfect competition, but also for forms of imperfect competition where prices are above marginal costs.
Summarizing, we can say that under perfect competition, one could rely on the market to provide optimal incentives for capacity investments. However, this does not mean that prices should always be equal to marginal costs, as during peak periods firms must be allowed to cover their investment costs by scarcity rents.
C. Capacity Markets
Following the intuition that scarcity rents are needed to cover investment costs, it is often argued that price caps, which should mitigate market power, destroy investment incentives. The scarcity rents capped by the price cap are generally called the "'missing money"' in the respective stream of Literature over which Cramton and Stoft (2006) give an excellent overview.
The same stream of literature argues in favor of capacity markets which should create additional investment incentives. These additional incentives should overcome the missing money problem and seem to be aimed to account for welfare considerations which are not contained into the welfare losses due to rationing which we described above. If capacity is binding, the price of electricity is equal to the willingness to pay of the marginal consumer. The consumers on the electricity wholesale market however, are not the end users but usually retailers and it might well be that they care less than their end users about electricity deliveries which had to be price rationed. A possible solution for this problem might be to make electricity retailers pay penalties for the value of lost load (VOLL). Burger and von Geymller (2007) present a case study in which the direct regulation of supply security is verified.
D. Peak-load pricing under imperfect competition
The seminal article when it comes to capacity choice under imperfect competition is Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) who showed that firms would choose exactly the Cournot quantities in a two stage game. Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997) analyze investment under demand uncertainty with quantity competition in the second stage and compare that to a Cournot game played in expected demand which they call the Cournot certainty equivalent game. These models are examples of two stage closed loop games. Grimm and Zoettl (2007) uses an analytical closed loop model to analyze the effect of Cournot competition in the first, and Bertrand competition in the second stage for example. How optimal incentives to invest in electricity generation equipment are distorted by an oligopolistic situation is discussed from a very practical point of view in Brunekreeft and Twelemann (2005) for example. Genc et al. (2007) , Genc (2007) and Lise and Kruseman (2008) discuss numerical models of electricity markets based on open loop games but do not focus on economic explanations of the effects found. As we use an open loop information structure, in our model, there is always the same mode of competition in the first and the second stage of the game which might be intuitive, as -at least in the electricity market -there is no obvious reason why firms should first interact on the basis of Cournot and then follow a Bertrand logic or vice versa.
Under imperfect competition, firms have an incentive to reduce investments, thereby driving up the price in peak periods and increasing their profits. Of course, in the long run, this only works if there are barriers to entry beyond the unit costs of investment. Figure 3 shows results from a simplified version of our model. The three vertical lines indicate what the chosen capacity would be in the cases of a Monopoly (K M ), an Oligopoly with (4 Players) (K Olig ) or under perfect competition (K Com ). It can be seen easily, that there is an underinvestment problem in the case of an oligopoly, which is somewhere between the two benchmark cases. How capacity choice in the case of perfect competition works, has been outlined above. A Monopolist considers its marginal revenue (M R) when deciding on his optimal quantity. Figure 3 illustrates the effect of a price cap (PC) on investment incentives if the market price is above total unit costs due to market power. The price cap makes it impossible for the firm to increase profits by withholding or not building capacity and thereby, contrary to the missing money argument, can as well increase investments in an oligopolistic setting.
IV. THE MODEL

A. Static model -peak load pricing
We begin with a static version of our model to establish the link to the economic intuition outlined in the previous section. There are four players and a strategic fringe, indexed by i ∈ N (RWE, EON, Vattenfall, EnBW), seven technologies k ∈ K and six different market states m ∈ M . Each of the players maximizes the following profit function: Table III . q m i,k is the quantity produced with each technology by each player in each market state and K i,k is the corresponding capacity which is now given for each player as we are solving for the short run equilibrium. c k are the short run variable costs which are the same for each producer. The parameter ν m says how often a certain demand state occurs. This parameter is used as a weight for the shadow price of capacity. We derived the Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions to obtain a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) and solved it by using the PATH Solver in GAMS.
Table VII in the appendix shows the quantities predicted by our oligopoly model. While during a high demand state almost all capacities are used, during low demand states hard coal plants are the most expensive technology in the merit order curve. Prices differ significantly but are above marginal costs even if demand is very low. Please note, that there is strategic capacity withholding as not all capacities are brought to the market even if more than the variable costs were covered.
As we used a Lagrangian method to calculate this short run equilibrium, we can have a look at the shadow prices of capacity to see how much an additional unit of capacity would be worth for each player. Please note that this values cannot be smaller than zero as, in our setup, there always exists the option of not using existing capacities. There are only positive scarcity rents if the capacity of the technology is binding. So please note that there are positive values for almost all technologies during extremely high demand states as most of the capacities become binding then. For smaller players like Vattenfall and EnBW shadow prices are far higher as the effect of less scarcity, and thereby lower prices is less important if firms sell less. This means that it is impossible to assess the investment incentives for firms on a market like the electricity market (oligopoly with L-shaped cost functions) without considering the strategic implications such investments have.
B. Dynamic model
In this part, we introduce two deciding factors. First, dynamics and thereby investments which link the different time periods. Second, uncertainty which is accounted for by a binomial scenario tree and leads to a recourse problem. The uncertainty about future demand is accounted for by different demand scenarios. Our approach follows the game with probabilistic scenarios (GPS) method by Genc et al. (2007) . Our two stage Model looks as follows. and I t i,k . By considering different demand scenarios (s ∈ S) and the associated probabilities (p s ), the players take into account how demand might evolve in the future. Capacities now evolve over time t ∈ T according to the state equation (5). The capacity constraints are given in (3) and (4). Quantities are allowed to adapt to the scenarios, thereby accounting for the fact that firms can always react to demand by adjusting their short run production. On the contrary, investments are not allowed to differ in such a way as they have to be set in advance when it is not clear yet how high demand might be. Please note, that quantities do not depend on what other players might invest. They do depend however, on how high own investments are. If quantities would depend on investments of other players as well, we would enter the realm of feedback or closed loop games (which are the same in the case of a two-stage game). It has to be noted here that the solution of a closed loop game can, and will, in general, be different from the solution of an open loop game.
In an alternative version of our model, we implemented a Price Cap (P C), so the following additional constraint was added: 
Adding price caps showed interesting results as investments indeed seemed to increase when price caps were lowered. As this is work in progress however, the results are not given jet.
To solve the model, we derive the KKT conditions to obtain an MCP problem which we solve by using GAMS and the PATH solver. For the model above, we used the Cournot approach to derive the first order conditions 2 . For the competitive benchmark, we solved the problem under the assumption that just one welfare maximizing player disposes of all the initial capacities of the five players. The welfare maximizing player is assumed to set prices equal to marginal costs.
V. RESULTS
In this first version of the model with only two stages we considered a framework in which firms decide upon investments now, and the second stage of the game lasts for five years. For the discount factor, we assume an interest rate of 3% p.a. and thereby assume that this figure is the same for all players. Equivalently, we set the depreciation rate to 3% per year. Our model setup is such that we can answer to what extent, in the medium run, investment paths that arise from our oligopolistic market deviate from the optimum. In the first stage, the results are the same as in the static version of our model (see Table VII ). For the investment incentives, now expected shadow prices (by considering the different demand scenarios that might evolve) are considered by the firms when they decide on whether and in which technology to invest in. Total quantities and prices for the oligopoly model and the perfectly competitive model at each point in time, and each scenario are given in Table V . Of course, prices are lower in the low demand scenarios than in the high demand scenarios. However, in all cases, due to investments and thereby higher quantities, prices in period two are lower than in period one. Compared to the optimal results for prices and qualities, prices are always higher and quantities are lower in the oligopoly case.
Our main results are our predictions for invested quantities. It can be seen in Table VI that, given the cost and demand information we have, brown coal seems to be the dominant technology choice. If we rule out brown coal, which might be plausible as there is only a limited number of available sites, nuclear plants for the social planner, and nuclear and hard coal plants for the oligopolists become the technology of choice.
What can be said without ambiguity, is that the amount of capacity which is built is considerably distorted downwards by the effects of oligopolistic competition in an otherwise unchanged model. Please note however, that we have so far only calculated a first best optimum. As this is work in progress, the second best welfare solution is still to come. For most of the players, additional capacity is of no value, even in high demand states. This is intuitive however, as an additional unit of capacity might be not worth it for a big player because it lowers the price he gets for all the other 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our results suggest that it is impossible to assess the investment incentives for firms on an electricity market (oligopoly with L-shaped cost functions) without considering the strategic implications such investments have.
In this paper, we investigate inhowfar deregulated electricity markets can be expected to deliver optimal capacity investments. A purely analytical model cannot answer this question. As pointed out in Section III, it is unclear whether the combination of a peak load pricing problem in an oligopolistic market structure and uncertainty will create under-or even overinvestment. The German electricity market provided us with a real world example for our numerical model. Building on Genc et al. (2007) we extend their framework further toward a more realistic representation of market states and technologies and develop a normative welfare-optimal benchmark. Furthermore, we linked the interpretation of such a model to the economic literature. We came to the preliminary conclusion that there seems to be an underinvestment problem arising from the current market framework and that introducing more competition would increase investments. Additionally, it seems as if the current market setup distorts investment choices away from flexible but capital intensive technologies. This conclusion looks even gloomier in the light of aging plants which have to be replaced and the nuclear phase out.
Price Caps might not be as bad for investments as suggested by some authors as in the case of an oligopolistic investment model, they might even provide a remedy against underinvestments.
Further research will focus on a model which allows more conclusions about the long run development of capacities. Additionally, the use of different information structures seems promising.
